Barron's: CVS, UnitedHealth and Cigna’s PBMs Were Big Players in the Opioid Crisis

The higher the dosage, the bigger the rebate for the PBM.

A recent Barron’s exposé detailing pharmacy benefit managers' (PBMs) backroom dealings in the opioid crisis should be read by everyone. PBMs, which most Americans encounter only indirectly through their health insurance plans, have quietly amassed enormous power over which medications we have access to — and how much they cost. This power extends not only to routine prescriptions but also, as it turns out, to some of the most devastating public health crises of our time.

The report reveals that the largest PBMs — CVS Caremark, UnitedHealth’s Optum Rx, and Cigna’s Express Scripts — were heavily involved in the distribution of OxyContin, a drug at the center of the opioid epidemic. Between 2016 and 2017, these companies raked in more than $400 million in fees and rebates from Purdue Pharma, OxyContin’s manufacturer. That these rebates were essentially tied to the volume of opioids sold is not just alarming — it’s emblematic of how these middlemen prioritize profit over public health.

The role of PBMs in drug pricing and availability has been contentious for years. The middlemen argue that their rebate system helps lower costs for employers and insurance plans, but this claim often falls apart under scrutiny. As Barron’s found, PBMs received as much as 19.75% in rebates from OxyContin sales, depending on the dosage and the number of pills prescribed. The higher the dosage, the bigger the rebate and profits. This system, which rewards higher utilization of a dangerous opioid, contradicts the PBMs’ – like CVS Caremark’s – own professed claims of fighting opioid abuse.

For years, PBMs have presented themselves as crucial gatekeepers, using their clout to negotiate lower drug prices. But the reality, as the article highlights, is far murkier. PBMs, including CVS Caremark and Express Scripts, claim they pass the majority of rebates back to their clients — figures as high as 99%. Yet, these rebates are negotiated in secret, and consumers rarely see the benefits. The rebates often serve to maintain PBMs’ relationships with drugmakers, who want to secure prime placement on formularies — the list of drugs an insurance plan covers.

The opioid crisis, as Barron’s demonstrates, could be a chilling preview of how PBM-driven rebate schemes might contribute to other drug pricing scandals. If PBMs have been willing to accept massive rebates from Purdue Pharma in exchange for keeping OxyContin widely available during a deadly opioid epidemic, what other drugs have been pushed to the forefront based on financial incentives rather than medical necessity or effectiveness?

The documents that Barron’s obtained, many of which were previously confidential, show that PBMs had ample opportunity to stem the tide of opioid overprescribing. They could have placed stricter limitations on OxyContin or required prior authorization (which they make significant use of for medically necessary medications) to ensure that the drug was being prescribed appropriately. Instead, they allowed Purdue to maintain a stronghold on the market. According to memos, PBMs even demanded higher rebates as the opioid epidemic worsened. 

As the article suggests, this isn’t merely a historical issue. The opioid crisis may have peaked in the late 2010s, but its effects are still being felt today. And the practices of PBMs — opaque rebate deals, backroom negotiations and a relentless focus on profit — are still very much in place. While Purdue Pharma and its executives have been held accountable through legal settlements, PBMs have largely escaped similar consequences. The lawsuits against PBMs for their role in the opioid crisis are still ongoing, and CVS Caremark’s $5 billion settlement, finalized last year, didn’t even require an admission of wrongdoing.

This begs a larger question about the pharmaceutical supply chain as a whole. If PBMs have the power to negotiate how drugs like OxyContin are covered, and if their decisions are driven by maximizing profits through rebates, can they really claim to be stewards of affordable health care? (Regular readers of this newsletter should roll their eyes at that question.)

For too long, PBMs have operated with little transparency. As the Barron’s investigation shows, this secrecy has allowed them to profit handsomely from one of the deadliest public health crises in U.S. history. The opioid crisis could be the most egregious example of PBM malfeasance, but it’s far from the only one. As long as PBMs continue to operate without appropriate oversight, the American public will remain vulnerable to their influence over drug prices — and, by extension, their health.